For Saudi Arabia, which built its wealth on vast oil reserves, the need to attract investors and diversify is increasingly pressing as the world seeks to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels. Yet giving foreign firms an ultimatum to set up in the kingdom might hinder rather than help its cause, said Jim Krane, research fellow at Rice University's Baker Institute in Houston, saying it "smacks a bit of desperation and arbitrariness".

Dubai, which snatched the regional crown from nearby Bahrain in the s, has already shown it is ready to fight to keep its title. Yet the race to attract businesses does not necessarily mean a binary choice of Riyadh or Dubai, as CSG has shown. The Nasdaq-listed firm may be shifting its regional operations to Riyadh, but it has no plans to shut its Dubai office.

Rift at Novalpina Capital, whose fund owns surveillance equipment firm, has been largely concealed from public view In the US, NSO Group is being sued by WhatsApp following allegations its software was used to target app users. It denies the claim. Two years later, the business partners are locked in a behind-the-scenes power struggle that has been largely concealed from public view. And it may have significant implications for Novalpina Capital fund investments, including NSO Group, whose technology has allegedly been used by repressive regimes to target human rights activists, political opponents and journalists.

The document and other sources have nevertheless painted a picture of a rupture at the heart of the private equity group. Relations between the partners are understood to have been strained for several months. Kowski declined to comment. The Guardian could not reach Lueken. A spokesperson for Novalpina, who represents all three partners, declined to comment.

NSO Group has denied the claim and, because it has claimed it acts on behalf of foreign governments, is seeking sovereign immunity from the suit. The company also argues that its government clients are only meant to use its technology against terrorists and criminals, and it is not privy to who is targeted by its surveillance tools. Do you have information about this story? Email stephanie. The City of London financial centre, which has resembled a ghost town since the coronavirus swept the world last year, is likely to see most workers return to their offices after the pandemic, the City's political leader said on Tuesday.

Catherine McGuinness, policy chair at the City of London Corporation, told BBC radio she was confident that trade would return for the cafes, pubs, restaurants and other businesses that rely on the usually teeming crowds of office workers. Supreme Court justices on Monday struggled in a case involving Goldman Sachs Group Inc over how judges should determine when shareholders can collectively sue publicly traded companies for fraudulent statements that keep their stock prices artificially high. The justices heard arguments in Goldman's appeal of a lower court ruling that permitted a class action suit by shareholders accusing the bank and three former executives of concealing conflicts of interest when creating risky subprime securities before the financial crisis in violation of a federal investor-protection law.

The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System and other pensions that purchased Goldman shares between February and June sued the company, accusing it of violating an anti-fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of and a related SEC regulation. The U. Customs has found forced labour practices in Top Glove Corp Bhd's production of disposable gloves and directed its ports to seize goods from the manufacturer, it said on Monday.

In a statement overnight, U. Customs and Border Protection CBP said it has sufficient information to determine labour abuses at the world's largest medical glove maker. CBP issued an order in July last year that barred imports from two of Top Glove's subsidiaries on suspicion of labour abuses. Japanese retail sales fell for the third straight month in February as households kept a lid on expenditure amid the coronavirus emergency, underscoring the fragile nature of the economy's recovery from last year's slump.

Retail sales lost 1. Stay on top of the latest market trends and economic insights with Axios Markets. Jordan Calhoun will succeed her. Interim editor Mike Ballaban left the following April. Browning and managing editor Caitlin PenzeyMoog left the outlet shortly after the deal.

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Yes, but: Turnover is common in digital media. More from Axios: Sign up to get the latest market trends with Axios Markets. Subscribe for free. Pakistani militants regularly stage attacks on polio teams and police escorting them, claiming the anti-polio drive is part of a Western conspiracy to sterilize children or collect intelligence. Shares in AirAsia Group Bhd fell in morning trade on Tuesday, as analysts lowered earnings forecasts after the Malaysian budget airline group posted its record quarterly loss.

Without loss of generality, it may be specified that v is normalized so that the sum of its four components is unity. In the limit as n approaches infinity, M will converge to a matrix with fixed values, giving the long-term probabilities of an encounter producing j which will be independent of i. Thus the stationary vector specifies the equilibrium outcome probabilities for X. In , William H. Press and Freeman Dyson published a new class of strategies for the stochastic iterated prisoner's dilemma called "zero-determinant" ZD strategies.

Tit-for-tat is a ZD strategy which is "fair" in the sense of not gaining advantage over the other player. However, the ZD space also contains strategies that, in the case of two players, can allow one player to unilaterally set the other player's score or alternatively, force an evolutionary player to achieve a payoff some percentage lower than his own.

The extorted player could defect but would thereby hurt himself by getting a lower payoff. Thus, extortion solutions turn the iterated prisoner's dilemma into a sort of ultimatum game. An extension of the IPD is an evolutionary stochastic IPD, in which the relative abundance of particular strategies is allowed to change, with more successful strategies relatively increasing. This process may be accomplished by having less successful players imitate the more successful strategies, or by eliminating less successful players from the game, while multiplying the more successful ones.

It has been shown that unfair ZD strategies are not evolutionarily stable. The key intuition is that an evolutionarily stable strategy must not only be able to invade another population which extortionary ZD strategies can do but must also perform well against other players of the same type which extortionary ZD players do poorly, because they reduce each other's surplus. Theory and simulations confirm that beyond a critical population size, ZD extortion loses out in evolutionary competition against more cooperative strategies, and as a result, the average payoff in the population increases when the population is larger.

In addition, there are some cases in which extortioners may even catalyze cooperation by helping to break out of a face-off between uniform defectors and win—stay, lose—switch agents.

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While extortionary ZD strategies are not stable in large populations, another ZD class called "generous" strategies is both stable and robust. In fact, when the population is not too small, these strategies can supplant any other ZD strategy and even perform well against a broad array of generic strategies for iterated prisoner's dilemma, including win—stay, lose—switch. This was proven specifically for the donation game by Alexander Stewart and Joshua Plotkin in Generous strategies are the intersection of ZD strategies and so-called "good" strategies, which were defined by Akin [21] to be those for which the player responds to past mutual cooperation with future cooperation and splits expected payoffs equally if he receives at least the cooperative expected payoff.

Among good strategies, the generous ZD subset performs well when the population is not too small. If the population is very small, defection strategies tend to dominate. Most work on the iterated prisoner's dilemma has focused on the discrete case, in which players either cooperate or defect, because this model is relatively simple to analyze. However, some researchers have looked at models of the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma, in which players are able to make a variable contribution to the other player.

Le and Boyd [22] found that in such situations, cooperation is much harder to evolve than in the discrete iterated prisoner's dilemma. The basic intuition for this result is straightforward: in a continuous prisoner's dilemma, if a population starts off in a non-cooperative equilibrium, players who are only marginally more cooperative than non-cooperators get little benefit from assorting with one another. By contrast, in a discrete prisoner's dilemma, tit for tat cooperators get a big payoff boost from assorting with one another in a non-cooperative equilibrium, relative to non-cooperators.

Since nature arguably offers more opportunities for variable cooperation rather than a strict dichotomy of cooperation or defection, the continuous prisoner's dilemma may help explain why real-life examples of tit for tat-like cooperation are extremely rare in nature ex. Hammerstein [23] even though tit for tat seems robust in theoretical models. Players cannot seem to coordinate mutual cooperation, thus often get locked into the inferior yet stable strategy of defection.

In this way, iterated rounds facilitate the evolution of stable strategies. One such strategy is win-stay lose-shift. This strategy outperforms a simple Tit-For-Tat strategy — that is, if you can get away with cheating, repeat that behavior, however if you get caught, switch.

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The only problem of this tit-for-tat strategy is that they are vulnerable to signal error. The problem arises when one individual cheats in retaliation but the other interprets it as cheating. As a result of this, the second individual now cheats and then it starts a see-saw pattern of cheating in a chain reaction. The prisoner setting may seem contrived, but there are in fact many examples in human interaction as well as interactions in nature that have the same payoff matrix.

The prisoner's dilemma is therefore of interest to the social sciences such as economics , politics , and sociology , as well as to the biological sciences such as ethology and evolutionary biology. Many natural processes have been abstracted into models in which living beings are engaged in endless games of prisoner's dilemma. This wide applicability of the PD gives the game its substantial importance. In environmental studies , the PD is evident in crises such as global climate-change.

It is argued all countries will benefit from a stable climate, but any single country is often hesitant to curb CO 2 emissions. The immediate benefit to any one country from maintaining current behavior is wrongly perceived to be greater than the purported eventual benefit to that country if all countries' behavior was changed, therefore explaining the impasse concerning climate-change in An important difference between climate-change politics and the prisoner's dilemma is uncertainty; the extent and pace at which pollution can change climate is not known.

The dilemma faced by government is therefore different from the prisoner's dilemma in that the payoffs of cooperation are unknown. This difference suggests that states will cooperate much less than in a real iterated prisoner's dilemma, so that the probability of avoiding a possible climate catastrophe is much smaller than that suggested by a game-theoretical analysis of the situation using a real iterated prisoner's dilemma.

Osang and Nandy provide a theoretical explanation with proofs for a regulation-driven win-win situation along the lines of Michael Porter 's hypothesis, in which government regulation of competing firms is substantial. Cooperative behavior of many animals can be understood as an example of the prisoner's dilemma. Often animals engage in long-term partnerships, which can be more specifically modeled as iterated prisoner's dilemma. For example, guppies inspect predators cooperatively in groups, and they are thought to punish non-cooperative inspectors.

Vampire bats are social animals that engage in reciprocal food exchange. Applying the payoffs from the prisoner's dilemma can help explain this behavior: [29]. In this case, defecting means relapsing , and it is easy to see that not defecting both today and in the future is by far the best outcome.

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The case where one abstains today but relapses in the future is the worst outcome — in some sense the discipline and self-sacrifice involved in abstaining today have been "wasted" because the future relapse means that the addict is right back where they started and will have to start over which is quite demoralizing, and makes starting over more difficult. Relapsing today and tomorrow is a slightly "better" outcome, because while the addict is still addicted, they haven't put the effort in to trying to stop. The final case, where one engages in the addictive behavior today while abstaining "tomorrow" will be familiar to anyone who has struggled with an addiction.

The problem here is that as in other PDs there is an obvious benefit to defecting "today", but tomorrow one will face the same PD, and the same obvious benefit will be present then, ultimately leading to an endless string of defections. John Gottman in his research described in "The Science of Trust" defines good relationships as those where partners know not to enter the D,D cell or at least not to get dynamically stuck there in a loop. In cognitive neuroscience , fast brain signaling associated with processing different rounds may indicate choices at the next round.

Mutual cooperation outcomes entail brain activity changes predictive of how quickly a person will cooperate in kind at the next opportunity; [31] this activity may be linked to basic homeostatic and motivational processes, possibly increasing the likelihood to short-cut into the C,C cell of the game.

The prisoner's dilemma has been called the E. Advertising is sometimes cited as a real-example of the prisoner's dilemma.

When cigarette advertising was legal in the United States, competing cigarette manufacturers had to decide how much money to spend on advertising.